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NOTES AND COMMENT
TRUCKS ON OUR TURF:  SEEKING TO RESOLVE THE




Before the publishing of the below article, the United States Supreme
Court heard arguments for, and ruled on, the case of Public Citizen v.
Department of Transportation.2  In accordance with this note’s
recommendation, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit
decision and held that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration did not
have to issue an environmental assessment for proposed rules concerning
Mexican motor carriers’ safety regulation.3  In determining that neither the
National Environmental Policy Act nor the Clean Air Act necessitated the
claimed environmental analysis, the Court recognized the President’s inherent
authority to lift a trade moratorium held to violate the North American Free
Trade Agreement.4  This note provides several considerations and
recommendations for the Supreme Court in ruling on the delicate balancing
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of international and national legal principles.  As will be illustrated, this
author believes the Supreme Court made the correct determination.
INTRODUCTION
Man’s mind, once stretched by a new idea, never regains its original dimensions.5
Such it is with international trade.  What was once a world divided into
separate and distinct cultures has now become a globe where borders
continually fade and cease to exist.  Although this progress brings new
opportunities to many, it similarly awakens emotions of apprehension and
uncertainty, while creating clashes between what was known and what is yet
to be discovered.  A recent Ninth Circuit case, Public Citizen v. Department
of Transportation,6 illuminated inconsistencies that may occur when
transnational interactions attempt to fit into our previously ethnocentric
societies.  The discrepancy brought to light through this decision concerned
a claimed conflict between an international arbitration decision under the
North American Free Trade Agreement7 (hereinafter “NAFTA”) and United
States environmental law.
The arbitration proceeding in question began when Mexico became
frustrated with the United States’ refusal to open its borders to Mexican
trucks, causing the Mexican government to initiate dispute resolution
proceedings under NAFTA.8  Following the arbitral panel’s decision in favor
of Mexico,9 U.S. President George W. Bush lifted the blocking moratorium
and allowed Mexican carriers access to United States roads.10  A well-known
citizens’ rights organization, Public Citizen, challenged this action, arguing
that opening the border without conducting an Environmental Impact
Statement (hereinafter “EIS”) analysis violated fundamental U.S.
environmental policies.11  The Ninth Circuit held that the preparation of an
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EIS was necessary before the moratorium could be lifted.12  The Supreme
Court recently granted the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari.13
In reaching its ultimate conclusion, the United States Supreme Court will
be faced with a clash between two areas of substantive law:  international
treaty law and national environmental law.  Did the Ninth Circuit decision
correctly apply United States environmental law, or did it improperly interfere
with the resolution of a NAFTA trade dispute?  How should the Supreme
Court address the issues presented and balance the seeming inconsistency?
This note will address the question of how the relationship between national
and international law, as well as treaty and environmental law, will affect the
Supreme Court’s decision in Public Citizen.  Part I gives a brief history of
relevant environmental law and NAFTA, as well as the treaty’s connection to
the situation at hand and guidelines for NAFTA Chapter Twenty dispute
resolution proceedings.  Part II provides details concerning the arbitral panel’s
ruling and the Public Citizen case itself.  Part III discusses whether the Ninth
Circuit properly utilized U.S. environmental law, while Part IV examines the
international implications of potential outcomes.  The manner in which the
Supreme Court handles the connection between these two legal fields will not
only set United States precedent for dealing with future inconsistencies
encountered in international trade, but will also impact and change the lives
of many U.S. and Mexican citizens.
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.  Relevant Legal Foundations
On January 1, 1970, President Richard Nixon signed the National
Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter “NEPA”) into law.14  This statutory
scheme signaled the first nationwide comprehensive approach to regulating
the interaction between United States citizens and their environment.15
Several environmental predicaments fostered NEPA during the 1960s,
reflecting Congressional conviction that “our Nation’s present state of
knowledge, our established public policies, and our existing governmental
institutions are not adequate to deal with the growing environmental problems
604 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:601
16. S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 4 (1969).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
18. Id. § 4332.
19. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-76719 (2000).
20. Act of Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392.
21. See Clean Air Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676.
22. Id., Sec. 4(a), §§ 107-08, 84 Stat. at 1678-79.
23. Id.
24. Act of Nov. 15, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.
25. Pub. Citizen v. DOT, 316 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. A free trade area requires participating nations to eliminate trade barriers between one another,
but each country is permitted to maintain its own external tariffs when dealing with other states.  See
and crises the Nation faces.”16  The declared purpose of NEPA may be found
in the statute’s first section:
The purposes of this Act are:  To declare a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and
natural resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental
Quality.17
To reach these goals, Congress proceeded to impose extensive procedural
requirements on governmental action affecting the environment and resolved
to implement them “to the fullest extent possible.”18  Even so, this note will
demonstrate how the broad goals of NEPA have led to questions of exact
interpretation.
The well-recognized Clean Air Act19 (hereinafter “CAA”) of 1970 is a
mere amendment to the original federal air-quality legislation, dating back to
the 1950s.20  Congress again altered the CAA in 1977 to give it further-
reaching implications.21  These amendments mandated national air-quality
standards and deadlines for their attainment, as well as created an innovative
federal-state partnership structure through which states developed individual
“implementation plans.”22  These “road maps” aided states in attaining
compliance with federal standards overseen by the newly created
Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter “EPA”).23  Alterations in 1990
vastly enlarged the list of regulated pollutants and the EPA’s civil and
criminal enforcement capabilities.24
On December 17, 1992, President Bill Clinton made economic history
when he signed the North American Free Trade Agreement.25  NAFTA
established what is known as a “free-trade area” between Canada, Mexico,
and the United States.26  Congress later passed the agreement into law as the
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North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3301-3473) (effective January 1, 1994).  NAFTA purports to
“CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade
and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation” while
“STRENGTHENING the development and enforcement of environmental
laws and regulations.”27  NAFTA explicitly permits the individual nations to
adopt or maintain:
standards-related measures, including any such measure relating to safety, the protection
of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or consumers . . . including
those to prohibit the importation of a good of another Party or the provision of a service
by a service provider of another Party that fails to comply with the applicable
requirements of those measures or to complete the Party’s approval procedures.28
Congress similarly made it clear that NAFTA could not be construed “to
amend or modify any law of the United States, including any law regarding
. . . the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health [or] the protection
of the environment.”29  This specific provision sparked the current contentions
of those individuals and organizations advocating for truck entry barriers.
Generally, foreign trucks are permitted to enter the U.S. only if authorized
to do so.30  The Department of Transportation (hereinafter “DOT”) is required
to grant permission to any carrier that is “willing and able to comply with”
mandatory statutes and regulations.31  However, in 1982, Congress enacted the
Bus Regulatory Reform Act that imposed a two-year moratorium on the entry
of motor carriers domiciled in a “contiguous foreign country,” such as
Mexico.32  Due to repeated presidential orders of renewal, the moratorium
remained in place until September 19, 1996.33  Prior to the completion of the
last two-year extension, Congress enacted the ICC Termination Act of 1995.34
This law caused all “existing restrictions on operations of motor carriers . . .
domiciled in any contiguous foreign country . . . pursuant to section 6 of the
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Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982” to remain in effect until the President
expressly rescinded them for a statutorily acceptable reason, including
“obligations of the United States under a trade agreement.”35
On February 6, 2001, a specially convened arbitral panel held that the
United States’ sustained refusal to permit the entry of Mexican trucks beyond
the established zones violated NAFTA.36  In response to this proceeding,
President George W. Bush announced his intent to comply with this
determination through modification of the moratorium, according to his
statutory authority.  The removal would occur once the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (hereinafter “FMCSA”), a DOT agency, issued
regulations to govern Mexican-oriented trucks seeking entrance into the
United States.37  Hence, on March 19, 2002, FMCSA promulgated three
regulations.38  These regulations allow compliant Mexican-domiciled trucks
to operate within the United States past previously specified lines.39  DOT
published Notices of Rulemaking for two of the regulations on May 3, 2001.40
They were:  (1) Application by Certain Mexico-Domiciled Motor Carriers to
Operate Beyond United States Municipalities and Commercial Zones on the
United States-Mexico Border (hereinafter “Application Rule”);41 and
(2) Safety Monitoring System and Compliance Initiative for Mexico-
Domiciled Motor Carriers Operating in the United States (hereinafter “Safety
Rule”).42
DOT prepared a preliminary Environmental Assessment (hereinafter
“EA”) for the Application and Safety Rules.43  DOT maintained that the
statutory NEPA law did not require a full EIS, since the proposed rules did not
“significantly affect[ ] the quality of the human environment.”44  DOT did not
prepare an EA for the third regulation:  Certification of Safety Auditors,
Safety Investigators, and Safety Inspectors (hereinafter “Certification Rule”).45
The Federal Register published the three regulations as “Interim Final Rules”
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on March 19, 2002.46  On November 27 of that year, President Bush modified
the moratorium to permit Mexican-domiciled motor carriers to provide cross-
border services between Mexico and the United States.47
B.  NAFTA Chapter Twenty Dispute Resolution Proceedings
One of NAFTA’s primary dispute resolution provisions, Chapter Twenty,
relates to interpretation and application of the agreement generally.48  Chapter
Twenty calls for an initial consultation between conflicting Parties,
conciliation before the “Free Trade Commission,” arbitration, and ultimately,
binding implementation of the arbitral report.49  The drafters modeled the
terms after Chapter Eighteen of the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement and the pre-1995 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(hereinafter “GATT”) Article XXIII procedures.50  NAFTA enables Parties
unsatisfied with administrative proceedings in any of the three countries to
appeal a case to a binational arbitration panel.51  If Parties are still unsatisfied
with the panel’s determinations, they have the opportunity to appeal to an
Extraordinary Challenge Committee, but have “no ability to return to their
respective national court systems.”52  The end result, and the form of the
conflict resolution sections, had a definitive bend toward the United States’
formal and legalistic dispute settlement approach, although other members
would have favored a more informal, conciliation-oriented process.53
In most situations, Parties have a choice of whether to utilize NAFTA
Chapter Twenty or the World Trade Organization (hereinafter “WTO”)
procedures.54  Nevertheless, Chapter Twenty offers certain advantages, such
as the inclusion of disputing party nationals on the arbitral panels and a
somewhat greater receptiveness to experts.55  Chapter Twenty involves a
three-step process.  The procedure commences with a request for
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consultations:  “the consulting Parties shall make every attempt to arrive at a
mutually satisfactory resolution for any matter through consultations under
this Article or other consultative provisions of this Agreement.”56  If a
consultation fails to resolve the disagreement within the designated time frame
(usually thirty days), the complaining Party is permitted to seek good offices,
conciliation, or mediation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission.57  Thirty
days afterward, or after “such other period as the consulting Parties may
agree,” either Party is allowed to request the convening of an arbitration
panel.58
NAFTA states that the appointed panel will provide the disputing Parties
with an initial report, findings of fact, a determination of the legal issues, and
recommendations for resolution of the issues in question.59  Interestingly, the
panel’s determination “is not automatically applicable to resolve the
dispute.”60  Instead, the “disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the
dispute, which normally shall conform to the determinations and
recommendations of the panel.”61  Thus, some scholars criticize NAFTA’s
dispute resolution process as being more of a “recommendation” that falls
“short of authoritatively resolving the dispute.”62  Others state the panel is
merely a “political troubleshooting institution rather than [an] independent
arbitral body.”63
However, these stated condemnations are misleading.  The Parties’ failure
to implement the arbitral report may produce “prompt and serious
consequences.”64  After the arbitrators present their final report to the Parties,
the Parties “shall agree on the resolution of the dispute.”65  The word “shall”
has been interpreted to mean compliance is mandatory.66  If the Parties cannot
agree on a resolution within thirty days after receiving the panel report, then
the injured Party has the right to retaliate against the Party violating NAFTA
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rights.67  The complaining Party is allowed to counter by suspending “the
application to the Party complained against of benefits of equivalent effect
until such time as [the Parties] have reached agreement on a resolution of the
dispute.”68  Nevertheless, panel decisions are non-binding in the sense that
they do not have direct influence over U.S. law, and neither federal nor state
governments are bound by their factual findings or substantive
recommendations.69
II.  CASE UNDERPINNINGS
A.  Details on Arbitral Proceeding
On February 6, 2001, an Arbitral Panel established pursuant to NAFTA
Chapter Twenty, Section 2008, held that United States actions violated the
international treaty.70  The issue presented before the panel was whether the
U.S. breached Article 1202 (national treatment for cross-border services)
and/or Article 1203 (most favored-nation treatment for cross-border services)
of NAFTA by failing to lift its moratorium on Mexico-domiciled trucks
seeking to operate within the U.S. borders.71  Mexico also asked the arbitral
group to determine if the U.S. violated Articles 1102 (national treatment)
and/or 1103 (most-favored-nation treatment) through refusal to allow Mexican
investment in U.S. companies that provided international cargo
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transportation.72  This summary focuses on the first of these contentions, under
Chapter Twelve, as did the actual decision.
Mexico brought the above allegations before the tribunal, contending the
U.S. breached its obligations under NAFTA when it failed to phase out
restrictions on cross-border trucking services.73  Mexico maintained that U.S.
commitments in Annex I of NAFTA, and its affording national treatment to
Canada, required the requested discipline.74  In response, the U.S. argued
Mexico did not uphold the same rigorous standards as the regulatory systems
established in the United States and Canada.75  Thus, the “in like
circumstances” language in Articles 1202 and 1203 meant the Mexican
service providers could be treated differently in order to address a legitimate
regulatory objective.76
NAFTA came into force on January 1, 1994.77  Annex I of the agreement
obligated the Parties to phase-out certain reservations to Articles 1102, 1202,
1103, and 1203.78  With respect to cross-border trucking, Annex I provided
that a Mexican national would be able to obtain authority to provide services
in border states three years after NAFTA’s signing (December 18, 1995) and
cross-border trucking services throughout the United States six years after
NAFTA’s entry into force (January 1, 2000).79  However, on December 18,
1995, the U.S. Secretary of Transportation issued a press release stating
Mexican applications would be accepted, but not finalized until Mexico
improved its truck safety standards.80  This refusal continued the moratorium
on Mexican trucks that had been in place prior to 1995.81
As of July 20, 1999, the DOT had received 184 applications from
Mexican persons seeking permission to provide cross-border cargo services
into the southwestern states.82  Mexico and the U.S. agreed that the Mexican
domestic regulatory system was not identical to that in the United States.83
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However, the two countries disputed whether the differences seen in the
structures justified the U.S. ban on Mexican trucks.84  Consequently, the
arbitral panel can be seen as focusing on determining the requisite action for
the Parties under the national treatment and most-favored-nation clauses of
NAFTA, modified through Annex I reservations.  The panel also considered
relevant exceptions to NAFTA that might validate the United States’ above
position.85
Nevertheless, the arbitral group “decline[d] to examine the motivation for
the U.S. decision to continue the moratorium on cross-border trucking
services” and “confine[d] its analysis to the consistency or inconsistency of
that action with NAFTA.”86  Interestingly, this method was fully in line with
WTO Appellate Body practices.87  The panelists first examined NAFTA’s
objectives and goals found in Article 102(1).88  They also acknowledged that
Article 102(2) provided a mandatory standard for the interpretation of the
treaty’s detailed provisions:89  “The Parties shall interpret and apply the
provisions of this Agreement in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph
1 and in accordance with the applicable rules of international law.”90
Nevertheless, the panel still noted that NAFTA’s Preamble emphasizes the
Parties’ rights to preserve their flexibility in order to safeguard public
welfare.91  Importantly, the panel looked to the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties92 to identify the international law rules of interpretation
referred to in Article 102(2) of NAFTA.93  Both the United States and Mexico
agreed the Convention was appropriate for the stated purpose.94  The
fundamental principle of the Convention is Article 31(1), which states in part:
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
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of its object and purpose.”95  Thus, the arbitral group interpreted the disputed
treaty provisions with the understanding that the Parties accepted the binding
nature of NAFTA and the obligation to perform its requirements in good
faith.96  Article 27 of the Vienna Convention directed the panel not to examine
national law, but instead to look to the applicable international law; therefore,
the panel utilized neither the internal law of the United States nor Mexico for
NAFTA interpretation.97
The panel first held the Annex I reservation deadlines were unambiguous,
based on the ordinary meaning of the words.98  Thus, the U.S. should have
complied with the original December deadline, barring any additional
agreements or conditional elements relating to NAFTA.99  Similarly, the
panelists recognized that NAFTA’s negotiators carefully considered the
“character, purpose, mode of preparation and adoption of reservations and
their Phase-Out liberalization commitments.”100  Accordingly, the phase-out
obligations of the U.S. through Annex I must prevail unless there is another
provision in NAFTA that supercedes the aforementioned duties.101  The panel
then turned to this question.102
The disagreement between the United States and Mexico could be viewed
as resting on the interpretation of the phrase “in like circumstances” found in
both Articles 1202 and 1203.103  If read correctly, this language might enable
the U.S. to deny access to all Mexican trucking firms on a blanket basis,
regardless of the individual qualifications of particular industry members,
until Mexico’s own domestic regulatory system meets U.S. approval.104  If the
words are not construed in this manner, the U.S. actions would be viewed as
a de jure violation of Article 1202’s national treatment obligation.105  Given
NAFTA’s unmistakable goals and objectives, the panel held it improbable that
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the drafters intended the “in like circumstances” language to permit a
significant trade barrier.106  Moreover, a broad interpretation of these words
would render the national treatment and most-favored nation provisions of the
treaty inconsequential.107
Under Article 2101, safety measures adopted by a Party (such as a
moratorium) might be justified only to the extent they are “necessary to secure
compliance” with laws or regulations otherwise consistent with NAFTA.108
The panel employed the GATT/WTO jurisprudence to aid in determining the
correct definition of “necessary.”109  As a result, the arbitrators agreed with
Mexico and stated that any Party-created moratorium must secure compliance
with another law or regulation that does not discriminate and must not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably disguise a restriction on trade.110  The panel noted
it was unclear at what time, if ever, “the United States [would] be satisfied
that the Mexican regulatory system [was] adequate to lift the moratorium with
respect to all Mexican providers of trucking services.”111
In conclusion, the international arbitration panel, whose five-person
membership included two United States citizens, unanimously held the U.S.
refusal to consider any Mexican truck applications was inconsistent with the
obligation to provide national treatment.112  Hence, the continuation of the
moratorium beyond December 18, 1995, violated NAFTA Articles 1202 and
1203.113  The panel found no legally sufficient basis for interpreting “in like
circumstances” as permitting a blanket restriction on all Mexican trucking
firms.114  Article 2101 similarly did not provide any excuse for U.S. action.115
Consequently, the arbitrators determined the inadequacies of the Mexican
regulatory system provided an unsatisfactory foundation for the maintenance
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of the moratorium.116  The panel recommended the U.S. take appropriate steps
to bring its cross-border trucking service practices into compliance with its
NAFTA obligations.117
B.  Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation
In Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, a citizens’ rights
group challenged the government’s failure to conduct the requisite
environmental analysis prior to promulgating the three aforementioned
regulations regarding the moratorium.118  The plaintiff, Public Citizen, claimed
the DOT’s lack of preparing an in-depth EIS for all three laws violated
NEPA.119  Similarly, the plaintiff maintained the agency’s failure to conduct
a “conformity determination” to ensure the regulations did not disrupt
applicable State Implementation Plans violated the CAA.120  This suit
stemmed from the growing concern among southern U.S. residents that
increased Mexican truck traffic would substantially disrupt their environment
and lifestyle.121  As a result, Public Citizen brought this case to ensure the
moratorium remained in full force until certain environmental investigations
occurred and were sufficiently evaluated.122
The case was brought immediately before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.123  The court began its analysis with a lengthy discussion justifying
Public Citizen’s standing to sue according to Article III of the United States
Constitution.124  The plaintiff successfully demonstrated an “injury in fact,”125
causation,126 and redressability,127 giving it organizational standing.128  The
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Ninth Circuit explicitly stated “the issues before [it did] not touch on [the
President’s] clear, unreviewable discretionary authority to modify the
moratorium pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c).”129  Further, “neither the
validity of nor the United States’ compliance with NAFTA” was before the
court.130  The judges instead narrowed their investigation to “the adequacy of
the environmental analyses conduct by DOT before promulgating the three
regulations.”131
After recognizing the standard of review,132 the opinion moved to an
environmental analysis under NEPA.133  The court held the test for
determining whether the law required DOT to prepare an EIS could be viewed
in two phases:  (1) whether the challenged rules constituted “major” federal
actions; and (2) whether the rules might significantly affect the
environment.134  The court deemed the questioned activity a “major” federal
action through examination of NEPA’s Council on Environmental Quality
(hereinafter “CEQ”) guidelines.135  Under these instructions, a “major” federal
activity contains “effects that may be major and which are potentially subject
to Federal control and responsibility,” including the adoption of official
policy, such as either a rule or regulation.136  The court concluded the
regulations in dispute had a substantial probability of causing reasonably
foreseeable “indirect” effects, and, thus, met the qualification.137
The CEQ principles similarly defined “significantly” to aid judges in
resolving whether DOT regulations might affect the environment.138  Because
the CEQ indicates a proposed federal action must be analyzed in the local,
regional, and national contexts, as well as through long- and short-term
consequences, the court held that the DOT’s analysis was inadequate.139
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Additionally, the threat to public health and safety from added pollutants,140
the likelihood of uncertainty in deducing exact environmental impacts,141 the
prospective risk of violating high state-established standards,142 and the
extensive controversy surrounding the likelihood of these factors143 led the
court to rule the questioned regulations might “significantly” affect the
environment.144  Finally, the court concluded the DOT acted “arbitrarily and
capriciously” in failing to conduct any NEPA environmental analysis for the
Certification Rule.145
The next step in the court’s reasoning turned to language under the CAA.
The court looked to terminology stating the CAA contains a “conformity”
requirement, prohibiting an agency or department of the Federal Government
from engaging in, supporting, or providing financial assistance for, licensing
or permitting, or approving any activity that did not conform to a State
Implementation Plan.146  According to the court, because the DOT failed to
conduct a reliable environmental analysis, there was no guarantee the
regulations would not result in emission amounts excessive to CAA
requirements.147  Proper CAA scrutiny should take place at the local and
regional level, not the national one.148  Using a “but-for” analysis suggested
by EPA standards, the court lastly stated the EPA did not intend to omit all
federal regulations from the scope of this constraint.149
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the importance of United States
compliance with its treaty obligations to Mexico, it stated that such
acquiescence could not arise at the cost of violating established U.S. law.150
Consequently, the court granted Public Citizen’s petitions and remanded the
matter to the DOT to prepare an EIS and CAA conformity determination for
all three regulations.151  The Supreme Court of the United States granted the
government’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals on December 15, 2003.152
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III.  APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
As has been observed, the NAFTA arbitration panel and Ninth Circuit
decisions come down on opposite sides of the spectrum regarding this
controversy.  The relationship between the relevant treaty and environmental
law will certainly influence the Supreme Court’s ruling on the Public Citizen
case.  The method in which the Court manages the connection between these
two decisions will set national precedent for dealing with international trade
inconsistencies.  How the line should be drawn, however, poses important
considerations.  This note will first examine whether or not the Ninth Circuit
correctly applied U.S. environmental law.  The manner in which the Supreme
Court interprets these relevant statutes will prove paramount and pivotal in
reaching an ultimate conclusion.  Depending on questions of interpretation,
the Court may either avoid the inconsistency and delicate balancing
altogether, or confront it head-on.
A.  Presidential Constitutional Authority
The President’s direct action in lifting the moratorium began the chain
reaction that led to the Public Citizen suit.  When examining the duties
accorded to the President and the other two branches of government, the U.S.
Constitution provides a solid starting point.  A President exercises foreign-
affairs powers through his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,153
his ability to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,”154 and by
“tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”155  The Supreme Court
has defined the person holding this office as the “guiding organ in the conduct
of our foreign affairs,” in whom the Constitution bestows “vast powers in
relation to the outside world.”156  As with treaties, an executive decision, such
as the one involving the moratorium, “create[s] law applicable in U.S. courts
if [it is] entered with proper Presidential authority, and do[es] not conflict with
subsequent legislation.”157  Hence, Congress also plays a vital role in
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international trade.  United States Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 3
empowers Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”158  The
Supreme Court classified this power to control foreign trade as “broad,
comprehensive” and “plenary.”159
Trade reform agreements, including NAFTA, are created out of the joint
exercise of congressional and Presidential authority.160  There is an
intermingling of the legislative foreign-commerce power and the executive
foreign-affairs power to achieve the ultimate goal of reducing and eventually
eliminating trade barriers across the world.  NAFTA was an elementary, but
indispensable, first step toward achieving a free-trade area between the North
American countries and enabling them to better compete in a global
marketplace.  In fact, the same fast track Presidential authority that enabled
NAFTA to be initially implemented “has been the key procedural linchpin of
U.S. trade policy since 1974.”161  The aforementioned information illustrates
that the Presidential powers questioned in this scenario are well-characterized
in United States law.
B.  NEPA Applicability
This case is not the first time Public Citizen attempted to prevent the
implementation of NAFTA.  In 1991, the group formally filed a lawsuit to
compel the United States Trade Representative (hereinafter “USTR”) to issue
an EIS on NAFTA itself.162  After NAFTA entered into effect in 1992, Public
Citizen went back to court to ask for the EIS once again.163  Interestingly, its
argument in this second suit noted that NEPA did not apply to the President,
and, thus, based its case on the theory that the USTR was the responsible
agency.164  The reason Public Citizen took this angle in making its argument
is explained below.
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It is possible the Ninth Circuit made an error in holding that NEPA and
the CAA render illusory the critical distinction between a constitutional
Presidential action regarding foreign affairs and a subordinate federal
agency’s regulatory domestic conduct.  In fact, the decision may actually
remove Presidential discretion preserved through NEPA and the CAA.  If this
is true, the court’s interpretation, overlooking this afforded freedom of choice,
may hinder the executive branch’s ability to swiftly respond to international
diplomatic and economic issues.  Despite the fact that the three governmental
branches provide checks and balances on one another, there are instances
where the leader of our nation is called upon to exercise the foreign-affairs
power minus the hindrance of non-applicable agency guidelines.
As noted, the FMCSA is the Department of Transportation agency
responsible for motor-carrier safety and registration.165  The FMCSA fulfills
its duties under a broad statutory mandate that permits registration for all
domestic or foreign motor carriers that are “willing and able to comply with”
applicable safety requirements.166  Any carrier willing and able to abide by
these rules receives the qualification.  Hence, FMCSA possesses no individual
authority to base registration decisions on environmental concerns or to
advocate for enforcement of environmental requirements.  The agency noted
that in the situation at hand, “[t]he President, not the FMCSA, has [the]
authority” to open the border and lift the moratorium.167  This Presidential
entitlement is provided for in both NEPA and the CAA.
Scholars argue the EIS process has served as one of the “cornerstones”
of United States environmental policy for over twenty years.168  As a result,
approximately eighty-four other countries used NEPA as a model for their
own environmental impact assessment analysis.169  Nevertheless, this assertion
does not alter the conclusion that under the NEPA laws of this country, the
President is afforded special protection.  Although NEPA applies to both
economic and commercial agreements negotiated through U.S. governmental
agencies, a close scrutiny reveals the law is not relevant to trade agreements
made through the President.  Under NEPA, federal agencies must complete
a detailed EIS before undertaking what are referred to as “major Federal
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actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”170  To
assure compliance, the CEQ implements regulations defining these statutory
requirements, which are “entitled to substantial deference.”171  Within these
guidelines, “federal agencies” subject to NEPA do not include “the Congress,
the Judiciary, or the President.”172  No “agency” makes a proposal for trade
agreement legislation.173  “The President makes the proposal, and the
President is not an agency.”174  Congress chose to limit NEPA instead of
expanding its range to cover a broader spectrum of issues.  Consequently, the
President’s lifting of the moratorium falls outside the control of NEPA’s EIS
constraint.  The Ninth Circuit decision, therefore, did not have the authority
to delay the removal of the trade barrier.
The appellate court actually refused to address this issue directly.175
Instead, it carved a path through the maze by reasoning CEQ regulations
mandated FMCSA to prepare an EIS because the President’s action that
removed the moratorium was a “reasonably foreseeable” consequence of
FMCSA’s rulemakings.176  In reaching this deduction, the court relied
primarily on two CEQ provisions.  The first of these states a federal agency
is compelled to study not only environmental direct effects, but also
“[i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later in the time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”177  This
“indirect effect” argument has three principle weaknesses.
First, indirect effects that prompt an EIS must be “caused by [agency]
action.”178  The effects from the President opening the border between the
United States and Mexico do not fit this requirement.  Instead, the executive
choice resulted from compliance with a NAFTA arbitration panel’s ruling.
When the agency created the regulations, the President had already resolved
to lift the moratorium according to the belief that it would best serve this
country and our international trade relations.179  This conviction “prompted”
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FMCSA to issue its safety regulations.180  Therefore, the agency guidelines
themselves did not “cause” the indirect effects in question.  The Presidential
pronouncement did, and, as previously noted, this decision is exempt from
NEPA scrutiny.
Second, under the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, a subordinate agency that
participates in Presidential policy implementation is required to look at itself
as the “cause” of that policy.181  However, under the U.S. Constitution, the
agency does not possess any direct control over Presidential decision-making.
Appellate courts have also held agencies are not compelled to conduct NEPA
reviews of “ministerial” decisions over which there is no control.182  This
qualification is directly analogous to the present situation.  Here, FMCSA
conducted an environmental evaluation of its own safety rules, but did not
have to prepare an EIS to address the Presidential action over which it had no
control.
The third flaw involves a determination that a Presidential action is
subject to NEPA scrutiny.  As recognized, the President is not a “federal
agency”183 and cannot fall under this type of analysis.  NEPA’s purpose is to
“help public officials make decisions.”184  Even apart from the President’s
secure exemption, this goal is not served when a federal agency is required to
prepare an EIS concerning a foreign-affairs decision with potentially global
implications.  Consequently, the NEPA EIS requirement is not a necessary
step when Presidential discretion concerning international trade is involved.
The additional CEQ regulation the Ninth Circuit relied on maintains an
agency EIS should address “[c]umulative actions, which when viewed with
other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts.”185  A
“cumulative impact” is defined as an impact that “results from the incremental
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions” of any person.186  FMCSA conducted a
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“cumulative impact” analysis when it compared before and after effects of the
regulations’ execution.187  The agency did not conduct this analysis with
regard to the actual decision to lift the moratorium, as Public Citizen argues
should have occurred.188  Yet, the President’s choice is not an issue that falls
under the “cumulative effects” examination.  Instead, the border opening is a
Presidential decision exempt from EIS requirements.189  Even if the Ninth
Circuit had determined an EIS might have been necessary, FMCSA should
have been afforded the final discretionary decision-making capability upon
remand.190
C.  CAA Applicability
Arguments brought concerning the CAA are equally questionable.
Normally, under this statute, a federal “department, agency, or
instrumentality” may not “engage in, support in any way or provide financial
assistance for, license or permit, or approve, any activity” violating a relevant
State air-quality implementation strategy.191  As seen with NEPA, Presidential
actions are not subject to this CAA conformity obligation, because the
President is not considered a federal “department, agency, or
instrumentality.”192  Accordingly, while the CAA requirements apply to
agency-initiated regulations, a Presidentially-instigated action cannot be
restricted in the same manner.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff maintained the Ninth Circuit decision is correct
because Congress stated NAFTA implementation is subject to national
environmental laws.193  This contention reminded the court that while the U.S.
is under the obligation to comport with its treaty obligations, the environment
trumps when there is a direct conflict between treaty and environmental law.
Although initially convincing, this assertion overlooks the fact that the issue
presented here is whether the environmental laws mandate an EIS preparation
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of Presidential foreign-related action, not whether those laws are applicable
to NAFTA implementation as a whole.  The President’s decision regarding the
moratorium does not change the fact that a Mexican carrier, which obtains
authorization to operate within the United States, is still “subject to the same
Federal and State laws, regulations, and procedures that apply to carriers
domiciled in the United States . . . including those administered by . . . Federal
and State environmental agencies.”194  Hence, these protections will be upheld,
whether or not the trade barrier is removed.  Under the current system, all
Mexican trucks are barred, regardless of their compliance with these
regulations.  It is this scenario that the NAFTA arbitration panel deemed
unacceptable, especially since Canadian trucks do not face the same dilemma.
D.  Conclusion
From the above analysis, one may discern that it is entirely possible that
the relationship between the national and international substantive law
systems is not inconsistent at all.  Instead, the Ninth Circuit merely misapplied
the balancing tactics between treaty and environmental rules.  Contrary to the
conclusion of the court, the laws present various exceptions for Presidential
action that exempt his decisions from statutory scrutiny.  As a result, the
arbitration panel’s decision may be afforded deference, since there is no direct
conflict with U.S. internal law processes.  If the Supreme Court fails to take
this road of reasoning and determines a conflict with U.S. environmental law
does exist, it will then be faced with a strategic examination of national and
international policy interests.  In conducting this balancing, several concerns
arise.
IV.  POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS FROM THE ARBITRAL
DECISION
Apart from potential misapplication of U.S. environmental law, the
current outcome of Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation could have
further widespread implications involving foreign trade relations and the view
toward the United States’ international character.  The Ninth Circuit ruling
undoubtedly prolongs a trade dispute the President sought to resolve in
accordance with the requirements of NAFTA and the decision of an
arbitration panel.  Whether an additional delay at the hands of the U.S.
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Supreme Court would negatively impact the United States internationally is
the next issue this note raises.  Three areas of significance discussed in this
section are:  (1) resultant consequences of the interference with
constitutionally-awarded Presidential power; (2) future implications for
NAFTA; and (3) the United States’ global reputation.  The below analysis will
introduce questions of whether the Supreme Court should perhaps overrule the
Ninth Circuit, not for considerations of environmental law application, but
because of larger, global concerns.
A.  Potential Interference with Foreign Affairs
The Public Citizen decision may be viewed as constraining executive
discretion to conduct foreign affairs in two ways.  Initially, the lower court’s
use of NEPA and the CAA could endanger the President’s capability of
reacting swiftly and resolutely in the international realm.  As previously
recognized, only Congress and the President may regulate international trade
under the U.S. Constitution.195  The cases of United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.,196 United States v. Belmont,197 and United States v.
Pink198marked the beginning of a tremendous expansion in the conception of
independent Presidential authority relating to foreign affairs.199  The Supreme
Court ruled that “the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation . . . the Senate cannot intrude [into the field of
negotiation]; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”200  The President’s
“complete monopoly over foreign communications” finds justification in its
acceptance throughout our nation’s history and in various Presidents’
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insistence upon it.201  This authority is vital to ensure the smooth workings of
the federal government as it interrelates with other nations in the global
political realm.  The “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations,”202 combined with congressional delegation, is the
basis for bilateral and multilateral treaty actions.  As the situation at hand
demonstrates, the Executive branch is often called upon to react quickly to a
growing international dilemma, thus avoiding further confrontation with
neighboring countries.  The Constitution grants this ability to the President
and entrusts it specifically to that role.
United States courts have established broad Presidential authority in the
area of foreign affairs, “including the Power to conclude international accords
in the form of agreements not subject to the formal treaty-ratification
process.”203  The lifting of the moratorium falls directly within this category
of action.  Hence, neither the Constitution, nor federal statutes, required the
President to proceed through a prescribed approval process when he made the
decision to remove the moratorium.  In Public Citizen, the conditions
Congress did impose were satisfied through the FMCSA regulations by
November of 2002.204  Afterward, the President, acting within his inherent
authority and with express congressional authorization,205 removed the
restriction against Mexico.206  Public Citizen diverted this attempt at
compliance, and thus interferes with afforded Constitutional authority.
Secondly, Supreme Court precedent has held that the Executive’s
decisions in the “sphere of international trade are reviewable only to
determine whether the President’s action falls within his delegated authority,
whether the statutory language has been properly construed, and whether the
President’s action conforms with the relevant procedural requirements.”207  As
a result, the plaintiffs in this case cannot block the President’s proclamation
from transpiring through an indirect route and challenge.  “The President’s
findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not subject to review.”208
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that “legislation
conferring upon the President discretion to regulate foreign commerce
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invokes, and is reinforced and augmented by, the President’s constitutional
power to oversee the political side of foreign affairs.”209  These two grants of
authority weigh more heavily than the requirements of agency regulations that
are not designed to influence Presidential freedom.  In the area of international
trade, congressional authorizations of Presidential power “intimately
involved” in foreign affairs “should be given a broad construction and not
‘hemmed in’ or ‘cabined, cribbed, [or] confined’ by anxious judicial
blinders.”210  In agreeing to the implementation of NAFTA, the U.S.
government recognized that this treaty upholds the aforementioned
foundational principles.  In conclusion, it may be argued that the Supreme
Court should heavily weigh the manner in which this case decision could
encumber Presidential authority granted through the Constitution, even to the
point of sidestepping the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on environmental law.
B.  Importance of NAFTA for Economic Enhancement
NAFTA is a comprehensive trade agreement between Canada, Mexico,
and the United States, created to improve business transactions within North
America.211  The agreement eliminated all tariffs between the United States
and Canada by 1998, and will eliminate almost all tariffs between the United
States and Mexico by 2008.212  Since its implementation, the United States’
economy has grown significantly, and NAFTA has helped create fair and open
markets within the participating countries.213  NAFTA’s purpose is to “bring
about a sweeping change in the terms and conditions under which companies
do business in Canada, Mexico and the United States.”214  It never was, nor is
today, an “easy” road to travel.  Relations between the diametrically different
cultures have seen a confrontational past, due in large part to contradictory
economic conditions and personal values.  Despite the fact that Presidents
who act under broad statutory authority grants have “imposed and lifted
embargoes, prohibited and allowed exports, suspended and resumed
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commercial intercourse with foreign countries,”215 NAFTA execution created
trials the United States had not experienced before.
When former President Clinton reported NAFTA’s effects to Congress
in 1997, he stated that
cooperation between the Administration and the Congress on a bipartisan basis has been
critical in our efforts to reduce the deficit, to conclude trade agreements that level the
global playing field for America, to secure peace and prosperity along America’s borders,
and to help prepare all Americans to benefit from expanded economic opportunities.216
The former President even admitted that changes to United States-Mexican
trade policies would most likely not have come to pass without the
implementation of the treaty.217  This factor demonstrates the often-overlooked
underpinnings in play, and the strong desire held by our government to make
NAFTA successful.  If NAFTA is continuously challenged, and in essence
rejected through the judicial system, it will have little effect in enhancing
prosperity in North America.
President Bush himself stated that the new permission of Mexican truck
traffic is “consistent with obligations of the United States under NAFTA and
with our national transportation policy.”218  In addition, “expeditious action
[was] required to implement th[e] modification to the moratorium.”219  The
delay in compliance has already caused the Mexican government to implement
parallel restrictions on United States’ motor carrier operations and to threaten
additional trade sanctions.220  While those consequences harm U.S. businesses
and consumers, the U.S.’s international character is also in significant
jeopardy of being wounded if non-compliance continues.
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C.  Preserving the United States’ International Reputation
The global reputation of the United States is necessary to validate
national courses of action.  The question of which individuals are responsible
for preserving this status has been the source of much past controversy.  To
partially resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
importance of preserving presidential discretion in foreign matters and the
problematic nature of judicial interference.221  “From all outward appearances,
the President stands at the helm of our nation’s foreign affairs power.  He
meets with leaders of other countries, negotiates international agreements, and
commands our military forces.”222  The President derives this authority from
the “structure of our government and national practices that have developed
throughout the history of the polity that have facilitated the executive’s
agglomeration of power.”223
Since early in our country’s history, Congress has not doubted that the
President is the “sole organ of communication with foreign governments:
Congress does not speak or receive communications on behalf of the United
States, or negotiate with foreign governments, or ‘conduct foreign
relations.’”224  In the arena of international negotiation, the President must be
able to “speak for the Nation with one voice,” and make decisions on behalf
of the United States without a fear of repercussion through the Courts.225
Applicable to the case at hand, fulfillment of the President’s lawful
obligations should not hinge on “subordinate executive officials” having not
“undertaken environmental reviews of [his] actions or other matters lying
outside their authority, or because a court questions whether [his] action is
consistent with conclusions an agency reached in an EIS.”226  Interestingly, the
Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals that has applied NEPA and the CAA
to Presidential deeds.
The United States has been in a similar position before:  one of
attempting to justify to the international community an apparent disregard for
its negotiated treaty obligations.  Instead of defaulting to its transnational
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agreements, the U.S. has occasionally interpreted its own law in a manner so
as to circumvent governmental-approved concessions.227  Justly or unjustly,
this course of action damages the country’s international reputation and harms
facilitation of multi-lateral trade.  Two primary examples of this phenomenon
are summarized below.
Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa228 concerned a product liability suit
between an Iowan plaintiff and a French defendant.229  While both parties
initially worked under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant
eventually contested requests for depositions and documents.230  The
defendant argued the language of the French blocking statute, “subject to
treaties . . . ,” indicated the Hague Evidence Convention must be employed.231
The Supreme Court identified four possibilities for applicability of the
Evidence Convention:  (1) the Convention always applies; (2) the Convention
must be used first, but not exclusively; (3) the Convention is a supplemental
set of procedures for the Federal Rules that is optional under treaty law; and
(4) the Convention is not ever required, but is simply an undertaking to
facilitate discovery a U.S. court should use when deemed appropriate to the
relevant parties’ situations.232  The majority put the third rationale into
practice and held a case-by-case analysis based on comity is required in each
scenario.233  To the international community, the Court effectively overlooked
U.S. obligations under the Evidence Convention.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk234 created yet another
globally unpopular Supreme Court ruling.  The case involved a plaintiff whose
parents were killed in a car crash.235  The plaintiff’s attorney filed suit in
Illinois state court and decided to serve process on the German manufacturer
defendant by delivering the documents to its U.S. wholly-owned subsidiary,
in compliance with state statutes.236  The defendant parent contested the
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service, claiming the Hague Service Convention should have been utilized.237
The Court held service was proper,238 again seemingly overlooking the
relevant nature of an international agreement.  Thus, even though the
Convention’s Article I language indicates it is “mandatory,”239 the treaty is
mandatory only when it applies, such as an occasion to transmit documents for
service abroad.240
International critics argue the United States categorically took two treaties
and, through its legal system, rendered them useless.241  The Supreme Court
employed state law to “get out of” the Service Convention and made the
Evidence Convention, at best, an option.  The two above cases have resulted
in friction between the U.S. and other treaty partners.  Although the judiciary
and legal scholars have justified the results of both Schlunk and Aérospatiale
in a convincing manner,242 other nations are often deaf and blind to these
rationales.
It is important to remember that the Supreme Court will not be ruling on
international law in the Public Citizen case, as it did with Schlunk and
Aérospatiale.  Nevertheless, it should heed the ramifications these cases
produced, and keep these international concerns in mind when ruling on treaty
and U.S. environmental law.  Consequently, the Court must strongly justify
its decision if it elects to uphold the Ninth Circuit ruling, as anything less
could seem like another attempt to evade agreed-upon duties.  A solid
rationale describing why the Court chose to follow substantive environmental
law, despite the obvious conflict with NAFTA obligations, would help
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alleviate a flashback to Schlunk and Aérospatiale.  Although the President
possesses the ability to negotiate matters with foreign countries, other national
governments will not be willing to cooperate with the United States unless
they believe commitments will be honored.243  Congress has recognized this
predicament and taken steps to remedy the situation.244  Nevertheless, any U.S.
perceived slip-up could cause a more drastic response than would originally
have been expected.  Analogously, if the Supreme Court utilizes national
environmental law to avoid NAFTA obligations, the United States could again
lose credibility in the eyes of the international community.
CONCLUSION
This note has attempted to suggest how the United States Supreme Court
should balance the apparent inconsistency between national and international
law.  As has been demonstrated, perhaps there is no inconsistency at all.  It is
entirely possible the Court could overrule the Ninth Circuit and hold that the
NAFTA arbitration decision does not conflict with U.S. environmental
statutes.  The laws the Ninth Circuit called into question possess exceptions
permitting a U.S. President to act within his afforded powers in a manner done
so here.  Environmental law will also continue to be followed, as each
Mexican carrier must meet the given standards before it is able to operate
within the United States.  Only the blanket ban will be removed.  If the Court
takes this path, the balancing might be presently avoided.
Nevertheless, if the High Court chooses to adopt the lower court’s
rationale and either refuses to address the Presidential authority issue or
interprets environmental law as mandating an EIS, it should still consider the
international implications of a decision in favor of re-installing the
moratorium.  This note raised several prospective concerns regarding barriers
to the implementation of NAFTA and other transnational agreements.  For
many crusaders, NAFTA has become a symbol of “new-fangled
internationalist entanglements that threatens to compromise our
‘sovereignty.’”245  A disregard of the arbitral decision could spur this fight
against opening national borders even more, causing a retreat from the
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essential progress already made in global trade.  The judicial system should,
thus, strive to carefully examine challenges to treaty agreements.  International
commerce is inevitable in our future, and treaties such as NAFTA are only the
beginning footprints.  The Supreme Court will continue to face scenarios
similar to Public Citizen in the years and decades ahead.  As the realm of
international trade grows, these inconsistencies will not lessen; consequently,
the judiciary must establish a solid course of action as soon as possible to
provide both clarity and guidance, carving a path and calibrating the scale for
future balancing cases.
